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Many definitions are offered for corruption. The 
Enterprise Survey of World Bank defines corruption “the 
percentage of informal payments to public officials”. Jain 
(2002) describes corruption as “an act in which the power 
of public office is used for personal gain in a manner that 
contravenes the rules of the game”.
Although corruption is a variable that cannot be mea­
sured directly, in recent years, some organizations have 
provided corruption indices across a wide range of coun­
tries based on surveys to qualitatively assess the level of 
corruption. These surveys are based on different criteria. 
Some are assessed by country risk analysts based in the 
home country or abroad while others are surveys of local or 
expatriate businessmen. Others are surveys based on local 
residents. Ng (2006) assures that the three most popular sur­
veys are from the Economist Intelligence Unit, International 
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Introduction
Factors affecting stock market development in many coun­
tries have received a great deal of attention, especially Latin 
America, Middle East and Central Asia, which have shoul­
dered an increasing share of world growth. Recently, a num­
ber of papers have examined the impact of corruption on 
stock market development (see Ng 2006; Pinheiro 2010; 
Bolgorian 2012; Jain et al. 2012; Lau et al. 2013; Shahbaz et al. 
2013; Tvaronavičienė et al. 2013, 2014; Chêne 2014; Giriūnas, 
Mackevičius 2014; Peker et al. 2014; Šabasevičienė, Grybaitė 
2014; Caurkubule, Rubanovskis 2014a, 2014b; Raudeliūnienė 
et al. 2014;  Kaminskienė et al. 2014; Tunčikienė, Korsakienė 
2014; Kanapinskas et al. 2014; Tunčikienė, Drejeris 2015), but 
little interest was given to the impact of corruption on stock 
market development in Gulf Countries Council (GCC), the 
richest countries in Middle East.
Country Risk Guide, and Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI). 
One of the most renowned indices is the Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI) published by Transparency 
International. This index is defined as “abuse of public 
power for private benefit” (see Freckleton et al. 2011); it 
is an aggregate indicator that classifies countries based on 
the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among 
politicians and public authorities.
The aim of this paper is to examine the impact of cor­
ruption on stock market development in GCC. We explore 
the correlation between CPI and stock market development; 
employing market capitalization as a proxy for stock market 
development. The study covers a sample period from 2003 
to 2011 of six members of GCC, using pooled regression, 
random and fixed.
The main contribution of this paper to the ongoing dis­
cussion in the literature lies in two points. First, it investi­
gates the impact of corruption on stock markets develop­
ment focusing exclusively on GCC countries. It is interesting 
to investigate this relationship in such group of homoge­
neous countries considering the unique characteristics of 
these countries combining richness with relatively high level 
of corruption. This is important since many studies neither 
distinguish between developing and developed countries 
in their tests nor consider the special characteristics of 
certain groups within each category.  This is reflected in 
many challenging and conflicting results. Second, this pa­
per challenges the view that perceptions­based measure of 
corruption is not good enough as a measure of corruption. 
Perception­based measures have been criticized on argu­
mentative and empirical grounds, causing some researchers 
to resort to other measures or proxies that fit better into 
their econometric models. However, this does not seem 
to be the case with GCC as perceived levels of corruption 
perform rather well in explaining the variation in financial 
market development.
The paper is structured as follows. Section two provides 
a brief review of theoretical and empirical Studies on the 
impact of corruption on stock market development. Section 
three presents descriptive statistics and explain research 
methodology. Section four reports regression results and 
section five concludes.
1. Previous research
1.1. Theoretical literature
While there is a large consensus in the literature on the 
negative impact of corruption on economic growth, some 
researchers continue to argue that corruption has a moti­
ve factor on growth; there are two competing approaches 
on how the corruption may affect the economic growth: 
corruption greases the wheel of economy and corruption 
sands the wheel of economy.
In theory; corruption may not necessarily be bad for 
stock market development, Early studies documents a posi­
tive impact of corruption on stock market development 
(see Leff 1964; Lui 1985). The pioneering theoretical work 
of Leff (1964) stated that corruption works like the engine 
of economic growth in the situation when strict/inefficient 
regulations forced by the government because corruption 
“Enables the privates agents to buy their way out of politi­
cally imposed inefficiencies”. Ahlin and Pang (2008) claim 
that corruption raises the need for liquidity and thus makes 
financial improvements more potent.
Corruption may hold a positive impact on stock market 
development through its impact on FDI, acting as “grease” 
by expediting transactions and allowing private firms to 
overcome ineffective regulations and governmental institu­
tions (see Leff 1964; Huntington 1968; Bardhan 1997; Egger, 
Winner 2005; Cuervo­Cazurra 2008; Aidt 2009).
Lau et al. (2013) argue that bribery (a proxy of corrup­
tion) helps firms to overcome the inefficiencies in the eco­
nomic system and decreases uncertainty, which may lead to 
a positive performance. Furthermore, Chêne (2014) argues 
that corruption can overcome red tape and institutional 
weaknesses and “grease the wheels” of the economy in high­
ly regulated countries that do not have effective government 
institutions and governance systems.
In contrast, a number of studies suggest there is a nega­
tive impact of corruption on stock market development. 
Mashal (2011) argues that corruption loots economic 
growth by decreasing competition in domestic market 
which impairs efficiency of domestic and foreign firms. 
Moreover, corruption makes it more difficult and costly to 
conduct foreign operations through obtaining licenses and 
permits (see Habib, Zurawick 2002; Voyer, Beamish 2004; 
Cuervo­Cazurra 2008).
Ng (2006) argues that managers might participate in 
projects that they otherwise would not just so they can ac­
cept bribes creating waste and increasing transaction costs 
in the economy. Moreover, corruption may negatively affect 
stock market development through its influence on FDI. 
Wei (2000), Lambsdorff (2003), and Voyer and Beamish 
(2004) find a negative relationship between a host country’s 
corruption and the FDI it receives. Other academics refer 
to corruption as “sand in the gear” (see Jain et al. 2012; Lau 
et al. 2013) viewing government officials as bribe­takers 
who will try to set up hurdles for businesses so that they 
can extract more bribery.
Some studies suggest asymmetric impact of corruption 
on stock market development on the basis of the country’s 
development, i.e., whether emerging or developed. De Rosa 
et al. (2010) find that corruption has a negative effect on firm 
productivity in Central and Eastern European countries. 
Hillman and Krausz (2004) show that corruption brings 
short term performance advantages. For example, Wang 
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and You (2012) suggest that corruption is likely to increase 
firm growth when financial markets are underdeveloped 
whereas it deters firm growth when there are more devel­
oped financial markets. On the same vein, Pinheiro (2010) 
suggests that, in more developed countries, corruption is 
inversely related to stock market returns while, in develop­
ing economies, higher levels of corruption impact positively 
on stock markets returns
In contrast, Olken (2007) finds that corruption can 
seriously hamper the distributive efforts of developing 
countries. That is, the growth impact of reducing corrup­
tion is higher when the financial system is less developed. 
Conversely, a rise in corruption is more prohibitive in a less 
developed financial system (see Ahlin, Pang 2008).
A contradictory view argues that in developed econo­
mies like the UK, corporate bribery is not that obvious as 
in the emerging markets (Lau et al. 2013), so a financially 
developed country is hurt less by a given increase in cor­
ruption, since funds can be borrowed more readily (see 
Ahlin, Pang 2008).
Another strand of the empirical literature suggests that 
corruption plunders economic development/growth by 
increasing the cost of business and also uncertainty in the 
decision making process. Since Asset prices are determined 
based on future discounted cash flows; therefore, they are 
good measures for evaluating the cost of corruption from 
the investors’ points of view (see Ciocchini et al. 2003). 
Hence, corruption should increase the firm’s borrowing 
cost, decrease stock valuation and stock market develop­
ment (see Ng 2006).
Corruption does not only affect stock market devel­
opment but also affects its volatility. Pastor and Veronesi 
(2012) argue that if investors consider bribery as a resource 
for firms, it decreases uncertainty about government poli­
cies and helps overcome the inefficiencies in the country. 
In that sense, bribery may lower stock market volatility es­
pecially in emerging markets.
1.2. Empirical studies
Similar to the theoretical literature on corruption and stock 
market development, the findings from the empirical stu­
dies on the impact of corruption on stock market develo­
pment are mixed and conflicting.
A good starting point for this empirical literature review 
is with the paper of Ayaydın and Baltaci (2013) who focus on 
the role of corruption and banking sector development on 
stock market development using a panel data of 42 emerg­
ing economies for the period 1996 to 2011. They found that 
corruption level is significantly and negatively associated 
with stock market development.
Bolgorian (2011) analyzed a data set of corruption and 
stock market development measures such as market capi­
talization and total value of share trading for 46 countries 
around the world for the period 2007–2009, using a quan­
titative approach for investigating the dependence of the 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) on stock market devel­
opment. He found that countries with higher relative stock 
market development are less corrupt, and the power­law 
relation between level of corruption and stock market de­
velopment is significant at the 5% level.
Abdul Qadir and Yaroson (2013) highlighted the role 
of selected macroeconomic variables and corruption in ex­
plaining stock market development in Nigeria for the pe­
riod 1998–2011. Employing the Augmented Dickey Fuller 
(ADF) unit root test to analyze the stationary properties of 
the variables adopted in the study, they found that corrup­
tion has significant impact on the development of the stock 
market; the turnover ratio as a share of GDP which is used to 
test the market liquidity, has a negative impact on the stock 
market; and the real interest rate, foreign direct investment 
and value of shares traded to be significant in determining 
stock market development in Nigeria.
Cherif and Gazadar (2010) examine the relationship 
between institutional indicators and stock market devel­
opment using International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
to proxy for corruption. Using data from 14 MENA coun­
tries for the period from 1990 to 2007 and applying panel 
data and instrumental variable methods, they find there is a 
negative relationship between corruption and stock market 
development.
Yartey (2010) examines the impact of corruption as a 
part of institutional determinants of stock market devel­
opment using a panel data of 42 emerging economies for 
the period 1990 to 2004. He finds find there is a negative 
relationship between corruption and stock market develop­
ment. He also proves that macroeconomic factors such as 
income level, gross domestic investment, banking sector de­
velopment, private capital flows and stock market liquidity 
are important determinants of stock market development 
in emerging market countries.
Shahbaz et al. (2013) examine the long run relationship 
between financial development, corruption and economic 
growth in Pakistan using ARDL bounds testing approach 
and applying cointegration tests and VECM granger causal­
ity method to examine the direction of causality between the 
variables for the period of 1987–2009. They find that a rise in 
corruption has a positive impact on financial development.
2. Sample and data 
The study made use of data which were sourced from 
the Transparency international organization, World 
Development Indicators (WDI), and British Petroleum 
(BP) Statistical review of world energy 2014.
In order to test the relation between corruption and stock 
market development, we use the Corruption Perception 
Index (CPI), Market Capitalization (MC), Oil Price, Foreign 
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Direct Investment (FDI), Domestic credit to private sector 
(% of GDP), and GDP growth (G) for Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) for the period 
2003–2011 with 53 observations. The study period is limited 
to 2011 because the methodology of calculating CPI has 
been updated in 2012 by Transparency International. This 
means that CPI scores before 2012 are not compatible with 
those of 2012 and beyond.1
The following are the variables specified in the study so 
as to achieve the primary objectives of the study.
Corruption (CPI):
This paper employs the Corruption Perceptions Index 
(CPI), published by Transparency International, as pro­
xy to measure the level of corruption. CPI is compiled by 
Transparency International and it draws on surveys from 
different businessmen, country experts, international 
institutions and the local populace to report the extent of 
perceived corruption amongst government officials and 
politicians. The index is scaled from 0 to 10 where 0 means 
that a country is perceived as highly corrupt and 10 means 
it is perceived as the least corrupt (very clean).
Market capitalization (LNMC):
This paper employs the natural logarithm of capi­
talization ratio to proxy stock market development. 
Capitalization ratio is calculated as the value of domestic 
equities traded on the stock exchange relative to GDP. This 
index is obtained from the World Development Indicators 
(WDI) issued by World Bank.
Oil price (OILPRC):
The variable that we use to proxy for oil prices is crude 
oil price compiled by British Petroleum (BP) Statistical re­
view of world energy 2014. Given that GCC economies are 
oil­dependent, it is plausible that oil price volatility is an 
important determinant of stock market development. In 
real terms, the oil price drastically decreased in the period 
2003–2011 (with the exception of a price peak in 2009).
Foreign direct investment (FDI): 
Foreign direct investment is defined as  investment made 
by a company or entity based in one country, into a com­
pany or entity based in another country; Open economies 
with skilled workforces and good growth prospects tend 
to attract larger amounts of foreign direct investment than 
closed, highly regulated economies. We use foreign direct 
1 For details on CPI methodology update, please refer to http://www.trans­
parency.org/files/content/pressrelease/2012_CPIUpdatedMethodology_
EMBARGO_EN.pdf 
investment as a proxy of business environment. This varia­
ble is extracted from WDI of World Bank.
Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) (DCP)
In the last few decades, private sector has emerged as 
major participants in emerging stock markets. The domestic 
credit to private sector (DCP) indicates financial resources 
provided to the private sector by financial corporations. 
This variable is a natural candidate to proxy banking system 
activity and is computed as percentage of domestic credit 
to private sector as compared to GDP.
GDP growth (G)
This variable is obtained from the World Development 
Indicators (WDI) issued by World Bank to proxy economic 
growth. Table 1 provides a summary statistics for the above 
mentioned variables for the sample period.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the variables for the sample 
period 2003–2011
Variable Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
lnmc 4.2528 0.6459 2.9857 5.3217
cpi 5.3173 1.0187 3.3 7.7
fdi 3.9332 3.5910 –0.2733 18.3833
oilprc 66.826 24.5023 28.83 111.26
dcp 49.1829 15.8601 28.3958 85.1739
g ­0.0252 5.5073 –13.3333 13.5437
Table 1 clearly show a considerable level of variation 
in almost all variables across all countries included in the 
sample. Figure 1 depicts the behavior of each variable, by 
country, over the study period. CPI shows that although 
GCC countries have almost similar levels of corruption, 
two countries (United Arab Emirates and Qatar) enjoy 
lower levels of corruption compared to the remaining four 
countries.
Economic variables show unstable performance across 
time in Figure 1. The generally declining economic growth 
rate shows some improvements beginning from 2009. Each 
country seems to develop its unique story in terms of its 
ability to attract foreign direct investment. On the other 
hand, financial variables seem to follow a more homogenous 
pattern across countries. As far as market capitalization is 
concerned, the general trend is downward sloping, and the 
last few years of the series indicate a continuing decline 
towards below­average levels. 
3. Methodology
The literature suggests a wide spectrum of variables to 
proxy those elements of development that promotes the 
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expansion of financial market activities. In practice, de­
velopment research suffers numerous data issues, and the 
availability of data dictates the number of alternatives at the 
disposal of the researcher to a considerable extent.2 On the 
other hand, financial market development is measured in 
2 For example, a number of candidate variables used in the literature to 
proxy the level of macroeconomic stability, such as the level of unem­
ployment and  remittances could not by adopted in this study, as data 
were available either for a very limited number of years, or for a limited 
number of countries. Even for the most parsimonious models, it is almost 
impossible to compile a time­balanced dataset of a decent size.
a number of ways. The common measures are the value of 
shares traded, market capitalization, and the turnover ratio 
value of shares traded, all being taken as a percentage of 
GDP.3 It is not easy to isolate explanatory variables specific 
to each of these measures. Macroeconomic performance, 
for example, is expected to affect them all positively, but no 
distinction can be made on how this effect may differ for 
each. Therefore, the practice of regressing a variable that 
measures financial market development on a number of 
3 These are available from the World Development Indicators dataset.
Fig. 1. Variables variation across countries 2003–2011
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suggested explanatory variables remains an empirical issue 
on both sides of the equation. The fact that corruption is 
also measured in different ways by different institutions 
adds another complication. 
The usual starting point, the simplistic case, is to try the 
OLS regression, where the model can be written as:
 
1 2
3 4 5 .
it it it
it it it it
lnmc a cpi oilprc
fdi dcp g
= + β + β +
β + β + β + ε  (1)
This form assumes neither time effect nor heterogeneity 
or individual effects (i.e. country­specific effects, ui). The 
above model treats all countries in the dataset as identical 
individuals. That is, it assumes that there is nothing unique 
about any country, compared to others, that might have an 
effect on its financial market development. If individual 
country or time effects do not exist, then OLS is expected 
to produce efficient and consistent parameters estimates. 
Obviously this is not necessarily the case, as it implies that 
within­individual errors are uncorrelated. For example, if 
some unobserved factor such as business orientation of 
a given country, which is not directly captured by the in­
cluded explanatory variables, is higher than GCC average 
in a given year, then it should be the case that it is higher 
than average in other years too. A population­averaged 
estimation of the same model with cluster­robust standard 
errors relaxes this restrictive assumption and leads to more 
efficient estimators.
The most widely used panel regressions are the fixed­
effect and the random­effect models. While a fixed­model 
treat this heterogeneity though allowing each individual to 
have its own intercept, a random model deals with hetero­
geneity through allowing each group of countries to have 
its own specific error variance. The fixed model in our case 
can be written as follows:
 
1 2
3 4 5 .
it it it
it it it it
lnmc cpi oilprc
fdi dcp g
ι= a + β + β +
β + β + β + ε  (2)
Under this model, constant slope and constant variances 
are assumed across all countries included in the sample. 
Practically, an individual effect is a part of the constant, and 
it is allowed to be correlated with other variables included 
in the model.
The fixed­effects model (Eq. (2)) assumed that all coun­
try differences were captured by differences in the intercept 
parameters to be estimated using least squares estimator. 
Unlike the fixed effect model, a random effects model does 
not allow the intercept to vary across individual countries, 
but rather assumes a common (average) intercept for all 
countries and recognizes that these countries are a sample 
of a wider population, so that individual differences are 
treated as random rather than fixed. In other words, the 
intercept is considered to be composed of two parts, “fixed” 
population average (a) and random differences around the 
average (ui). The model can then be written: 
 
1 2
3 4 5 .
it it it
it it it i it
lnmc cpi oilprc
fdi dcp g u
= a + β + β +
β + β + β + + ε  (3)
where these random effects are assumed to have a zero 
mean, a constant variance and zero correlation across in­
dividuals. Hence, each individual country to express its 
own heterogeneous though having its own error variance, 
i.e. its own component of the composite error term that 
combines the usual regression disturbance term and the 
random individual effect.4 
Although the dataset is way far from rich, it is still wor­
thy to try a random­coefficient model where randomness 
in coefficient is applied to cpi only.
4. Results, discussion and limitations 
Regression outputs for a number of alternative log­linear 
forms / specifications are summarized in Table 2. Columns 
(1), (2), and (3) report results for three pooled OLS regres­
sions. While Column (1) drops g from the list of explana­
tory variables, Column (2) drops out dcp, with Column 
(3) dropping both, so that only significant coefficients are 
included. These two variables are significantly correlated, 
and, therefore, do not appear together in any of the reported 
models.  Next, each successive block of three columns fol­
lows the same specification on a different panel model. That 
is, Columns (4) through (6) report panel regression results 
for the same three specifications on a population­averaged 
model (robust error). Next, Columns (7) through (9) report 
results from the application of fixed­effect model, Columns 
(10) through (12) provides a similar report from the esti­
mation of a random­effect model, and, finally, the last three 
columns do the same job for a random­coefficient model, 
where coefficient randomness is assumed to apply only to 
the coefficient of our concern, the level of corruption (cpi). 
To preserve space, results from major statistical tests and 
other important statistics are reported in the lower part of 
the same table at the columns corresponding to the model 
to which the test was applied. The final row indicates that 
the sample size is equal across all the regressions reported.
Obviously, the results from the pooled OLS regression 
are not very impressive, with an R2ranging between 0.17 
and 0.18. However, the F­test strongly rejects the joint hy­
pothesis that all coefficients are not significantly different 
from zero. The coefficient of oil price is quite modest in 
magnitude and significant at the 5% level, but its sign needs 
some attention. Naturally, one would expect that higher oil 
prices result in more generous public investment spending, 
4 The random model is also called an error component model (see Green 
2012).
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as public revenues increases. Indeed, GCC public budgets 
are obviously tied to oil revenues, but extra revenues do not 
necessarily seem to translate into expansion in public invest­
ments subcontracted to firms listed on stock exchange. In 
fact, higher oil prices do make richer public budgets, but 
better economic performance in this region in general has 
been dependent on political stability. Oil shocks are rather 
harmful to investors’ confidence, as it causes entrepreneurs 
to reconsider their plans, and confuses financial market 
players. Therefore, a negative relation between oil prices and 
financial market development is more reasonable than one 
would expect. However, the magnitude of this coefficient 
is rather small and almost insensitive to the inclusion of 
other control variables such as the rate of economic growth. 
The coefficient of foreign direct investment, fdi, which 
reflects the development of business environment, has the 
expected sign. The magnitude of this coefficient decreases 
slightly with the dropping of control variables (g and dcp). 
The coefficient of our focus, corruption index, is signifi­
cantly different from zero at the 1% level of significance, and 
its magnitude is reasonable and robust against the inclusion 
of other control variables.5
The above model treats all countries in the dataset as 
identical individuals. That is, it assumes that there is noth­
ing unique about any country, compared to others, that 
might have an effect on its financial market development. 
If individual country or time effects do not exist, then OLS 
is expected to produce efficient and consistent parameters 
estimates. Obviously this is not necessarily the case, as it 
implies that within­individual errors are uncorrelated. For 
example, if some unobserved factor such as business ori­
entation of a given country, which is not directly captured 
by the included explanatory variables, is higher than GCC 
average in a given year, then it should be the case that it is 
higher than average in other years too.
A population­averaged estimation of the same model 
with cluster­robust standard errors relaxes this restrictive 
assumption and leads more efficient estimators, as can be 
seen from Column (4) through (6). Here, country specific 
effects are assumed to be random and are averaged out. It 
is clear that the coefficients differ considerably from those 
of the pooled OLS. All the coefficients in Model (6) are sig­
nificantly different from zero at the 1% level of significance. 
Their magnitudes as well as their efficiency are almost totally 
insensitive to the introduction of either g or dcp. As far as our 
focus variable is concerned, this indicates that, on average, 
an extra point on the ladder of corruption is associated with 
almost 0.18 point increase in logged market capitalization. 
5 Unfortunately, the two control variables used in this simple robustness 
check, dcp and g, are the only economic variables for which data is avai­
lable throughout the whole series. Inclusion of other variables available 
from WDI dataset, such as unemployment or remittances will result in 
unaffordable loss in degrees of freedom. 
Considering the value range of these two variables, the effect 
of corruption on market capitalization cannot, indeed, be 
described as a negligible effect. However, while a cluster­ro­
bust population­averaged estimator outperforms the basic 
pooled one, it is known that its standard error is not fully 
efficient. Panel regressions are usually used in accounting 
for heterogeneity across groups (i.e. countries) while not 
violating OLS assumptions. 
Columns (7) through (9) report regression output for 
the fixed effect model (Eq. (2)). The Wald­test strongly re­
jects the OLS model in favor of the fixed effect model. The 
magnitudes of the coefficients are considerably different 
from those of OLS in general, and all coefficients, except g 
and dcp are significantly different from zero. The magnitude 
of cpi is fairly close to its population­averaged counterpart. 
Columns (10) through (12) report the estimation results 
for Eq. (3). The coefficients are quite close to those of the 
fixed­effect model. The value of the statistic rho indicates 
that about 89 percent of the total error variance is attrib­
uted to country heterogeneity, also indicating a good level 
of goodness of fit.6 The test statistic of Breusch and Pagan 
LM test for random effects is estimated at Chibar2 (01) = 
121.9 which is significant at the 0.001 level of significance, 
indicating a strong rejection of the OLS model estimates in 
favor of the random­effect model. Therefore, both fixed and 
random effects are superior to the pooled model. A common 
test used in model selection between these two models is 
the Hausman test. The null hypothesis of this test states that 
the difference in coefficients between the two models is not 
systematic. Applying the Hausman test gives a test statistic 
the follows a Chi distribution with four degrees of freedom, 
Chi2 = 0.10, which is too small to reject the null hypothesis 
of the test. Therefore, the test says that it is better to fit a 
random­effect rather than a fixed effect model. However, 
although statistical testing tends to favor the random­effect 
model, there is a concern that our coefficient of interest 
might change significantly across groups (of countries), so 
a Swamy’s test can be used to test constancy of the param­
eters. The test statistic for this test is Chi2 = 200.8 which 
is significant at the .001 level of significance, indicating a 
strong rejection of parameters’ constancy. 
This result leads us to investigate the application of a 
random­coefficient model. Columns (13) through (15) 
from a random­coefficient regression, where randomness 
in coefficient is applied to cpi only.7 The values of the coef­
ficients are generally quite close to the results obtained from 
the previous two models. All coefficients are significant at 
the 0.05 level. An LR test of Random Coefficient Model 
6  ( )2 2ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 1 / urho Tε ε=ρ = − σ σ + σ .
7 The log­likelihood numerical optimization failed to compute standard 
errors when all variables where included as variables with random 
coefficients. This is not quite surprising given the humble size of our 
sample.
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against linear regression clearly rejects the liner regression 
in favor of the random coefficient model. The random ef­
fect parameter for cpi is significantly different from zero 
and both variance components are statistically significant. 
However, as far as our focus coefficient, cpi, is concerned, 
the coefficient is obviously significant and robust across all 
competing specification, a matter that enhances the view 
that corruption does grease the financial wheel in GCC 
countries. 
Conclusions
This paper investigates the impact of corruption on stock 
market development focusing exclusively on GCC coun­
tries. It provides empirical evidence, from the Middle East, 
on the effect of corruption on financial market, where the 
former is measured by CPI of Transparency International 
and the latter by market capitalization relative to gross do­
mestic product. 
Econometric analysis of this relation shows that corrup­
tion in GCC countries is positively associated with financial 
market development, and therefore confirms the view of 
many previous studies (see Leff 1964; Huntington 1968; 
Bardhan 1997; Egger, Winner 2005; Cuervo­Cazurra 2008; 
Aidt 2009) that corruption greases the wheel of financial 
development.
As far as GCC countries are concerned, the frequently 
criticized measure of corruption based on public percep­
tions, CPI, can actually explain considerable variation in 
financial market capitalization during the study period. This 
result challenges the argumentative view that recommends 
avoiding the use of perceptions­based measure of corrup­
tion in empirical analysis. 
Given the mixed empirical findings obtained from other 
studies applied to different economies, it does seem that the 
relationship between corruption and financial markets does 
not necessarily take a similar form across different econo­
mies at a particular time. However, it should be emphasized 
that despite data limitations, the relation between corrup­
tion and GCC financial market development is statistically 
significant and robust against changes in model forms and 
specifications.  
Finally, it should be noted that the main element that 
complicates the empirical study of the relation between cor­
ruption and financial markets development is the fact that 
both sides of this relation are being described in the litera­
ture by different competing measures. Therefore, future re­
search should pay more attention to the nature of differences 
between different types of measures, particularly those of 
corruption. Until a specific measure of corruption proves 
superior, the choice of corruption measure will remain an 
empirical question. Future research should also try to ex­
pand the sample to other countries in the region covering 
a longer time period, a matter that requires better access 
to economic and financial data for countries of the region.
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